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General William Hull
General William Hull was the most reluctant of
generals. An aging hero from the American
revolution, Hull wasn't keen to enter another
conflict.
History hasn't been kind to him
because of that act. He was
charged with cowardice and
treason for his action in Detroit,
court-martialled and sentenced
to death, but was granted a
last minute reprieve by the
president, who cited his
meritous conduct during
the American revolution.
It is an interesting contrast
between the two leaders —
Brock revered throughout
Canada and in England, while
in the U.S. the word "Hull"
became a derogatory epithet.
He became a convenient
scapegoat for all that was
wrong with the U.S.'s effort
the War of 1812. From Pierre
Berton's The Invasion of Canada,
we get a glimpse of the attitude
towards Hull and the ordeal
he faced following the war:
"When he is as last exchanged
(and Prevost is anxious to
release him because he believes Hull's return will cause dissension in
America), he faces a court martial that is a travesty of a trial. Here he
comes up against his old adversaries: McArthur, Cass, Findlay, Miller. But
his lawyer is not permitted to cross-examine these these officers or to
examine other witnesses; the old general, unschooled in law, must
perform the task himself.
"Though his papers were burned on their way from Detroit to Buffalo
after the surrender, he is not allowed to examine copies at Washington.
The court is packed against him: Henry Dearborn is the presiding judge.
He is unlikely to be sympathetic, for if the court acquits Hull of the
charges of cowardice and treason, Dearborn himself and his superiors in
Washington must be held culpable for the scandal at Detroit.
"The charge of treason is withdrawn on the grounds that it is beyond
the court's jurisdiction. Three months later, when the weary process is
at last completed and Hull is found guilty of cowardice, the court adds a
rider saying that it does not believe him to be guilty of treason. There is
more to this than simple justice, for the charge is based entirely on the
loss of the Cuyahoga and all Hull's baggage before he knew war was
declared. That misfortune cannot be laid at the ill-starred general's door
but at that of Dr. Eustis, the Secretary of War, who was scandalously
remiss in informing his outposts of the outbreak of hostilities.
"Hull, officially branded as a coward, is sentenced to be shot. The
President, taking into account the General's Revolutionary gallantry and
perhaps also pricked by a guilty conscience, pardons him. Hull spends
the rest of his life attempting to vindicate his actions. It is an irony of
war that had he refused to surrender, had he gone down to defeat, his
fort and town shattered by cannon fire, his friends and neighbours
ravaged by the misfortunes of battle, his soldiers dead to the last man,
the civilians burned out, bombed out, and inevitably scalped, the tired
old general would have swept into the history books as a gallant martyr,
his name enshrined on bridges, schools, main streets and public
buildings. (There is also the possibility that he might have beaten Brock,
though somehow one doubts it.) But for the rest of their lives the very
soldiers who, because of him, can go back whole to the comfort of their
homesteads, and the civilians who are now able to pick up the strings of
their existence, only briefly tangled, will loathe and curse the name of
William Hull who, on his deathbed at the age of 72, will continue to insist
that he took the only proper, decent and courageous course on that
bright August Sunday in 1812.
Why Hull didn't attack Malden when he could
Here, in Hull's own words, are the reasons behind his decision not to
attack Fort Malden when he crossed the Detroit river in July 1812:
"The fort at Malden I was well acquainted with. In time of peace I had
often been in it. I knew that it was capable of being made a place of
strength, and that, in contemplation of a war, the British for some time
had been using great exertions to put it in the best possible state of
defence.
"I knew, that for near twenty years, a field officer had commanded, and
about an hundred regular troops had constantly been stationed in it;
and that there always had been a regular corps of British artillery
attached to the command. The question was, whether, the troops I had
under my command, so few of whom had ever been tried, I was to
attempt to carry this fortress with the bayonet?
For myself, particularly, when I considered what would have been the
consequences of an unsuccessful attempt, I had a strong conviction that
it would be wrong to make the effort, until we could have the advantage
of heavy artillery. But finding that many of my officers, who had seen no
service, were impatient at delay, and were destroying my influence with
the army, and its discipline, by their complaints and censures - for their
satisfaction, and not for my own, … I called a council of war, in which it
was decided that no attempt ought to be made on Malden, without the
heavy artillery...
It may be said that between the first and second council, the enemy's
forces had diminished by desertion. No doubt it had as to numbers.
Great part of the militia had left them, and many of their Indian allies;
but the fort of Malden retained all its strength, and there was no doubt
but that their regular forces (of which not an individual had deserted)
and their remaining militia, was sufficient to man it. ...
My opinion was that an attempt on Malden should never be made until
there was an absolute certainty of success."
General William Hull was the most reluctant of
generals. An aging hero from the American
revolution, Hull wasn't keen to enter another
conflict.
History hasn't been kind to him
because of that act. He was
charged with cowardice and
treason for his action in Detroit,
court-martialled and sentenced
to death, but was granted a
last minute reprieve by the
president, who cited his
meritous conduct during
the American revolution.
It is an interesting contrast
between the two leaders —
Brock revered throughout
Canada and in England, while
in the U.S. the word "Hull"
became a derogatory epithet.
He became a convenient
scapegoat for all that was
wrong with the U.S.'s effort
the War of 1812. From Pierre
Berton's The Invasion of Canada,
we get a glimpse of the attitude
towards Hull and the ordeal
he faced following the war:
"When he is as last exchanged
(and Prevost is anxious to
release him because he believes Hull's return will cause dissension in
America), he faces a court martial that is a travesty of a trial. Here he
comes up against his old adversaries: McArthur, Cass, Findlay, Miller. But
his lawyer is not permitted to cross-examine these these officers or to
examine other witnesses; the old general, unschooled in law, must
perform the task himself.
"Though his papers were burned on their way from Detroit to Buffalo
after the surrender, he is not allowed to examine copies at Washington.
The court is packed against him: Henry Dearborn is the presiding judge.
He is unlikely to be sympathetic, for if the court acquits Hull of the
charges of cowardice and treason, Dearborn himself and his superiors in
Washington must be held culpable for the scandal at Detroit.
"The charge of treason is withdrawn on the grounds that it is beyond
the court's jurisdiction. Three months later, when the weary process is
at last completed and Hull is found guilty of cowardice, the court adds a
rider saying that it does not believe him to be guilty of treason. There is
more to this than simple justice, for the charge is based entirely on the
loss of the Cuyahoga and all Hull's baggage before he knew war was
declared. That misfortune cannot be laid at the ill-starred general's door
but at that of Dr. Eustis, the Secretary of War, who was scandalously
remiss in informing his outposts of the outbreak of hostilities.
"Hull, officially branded as a coward, is sentenced to be shot. The
President, taking into account the General's Revolutionary gallantry and
perhaps also pricked by a guilty conscience, pardons him. Hull spends
the rest of his life attempting to vindicate his actions. It is an irony of
war that had he refused to surrender, had he gone down to defeat, his
fort and town shattered by cannon fire, his friends and neighbours
ravaged by the misfortunes of battle, his soldiers dead to the last man,
the civilians burned out, bombed out, and inevitably scalped, the tired
old general would have swept into the history books as a gallant martyr,
his name enshrined on bridges, schools, main streets and public
buildings. (There is also the possibility that he might have beaten Brock,
though somehow one doubts it.) But for the rest of their lives the very
soldiers who, because of him, can go back whole to the comfort of their
homesteads, and the civilians who are now able to pick up the strings of
their existence, only briefly tangled, will loathe and curse the name of
William Hull who, on his deathbed at the age of 72, will continue to insist
that he took the only proper, decent and courageous course on that
bright August Sunday in 1812.
Why Hull didn't attack Malden when he could
Here, in Hull's own words, are the reasons behind his decision not to
attack Fort Malden when he crossed the Detroit river in July 1812:
"The fort at Malden I was well acquainted with. In time of peace I had
often been in it. I knew that it was capable of being made a place of
strength, and that, in contemplation of a war, the British for some time
had been using great exertions to put it in the best possible state of
defence.
"I knew, that for near twenty years, a field officer had commanded, and
about an hundred regular troops had constantly been stationed in it;
and that there always had been a regular corps of British artillery
attached to the command. The question was, whether, the troops I had
under my command, so few of whom had ever been tried, I was to
attempt to carry this fortress with the bayonet?
For myself, particularly, when I considered what would have been the
consequences of an unsuccessful attempt, I had a strong conviction that
it would be wrong to make the effort, until we could have the advantage
of heavy artillery. But finding that many of my officers, who had seen no
service, were impatient at delay, and were destroying my influence with
the army, and its discipline, by their complaints and censures - for their
satisfaction, and not for my own, … I called a council of war, in which it
was decided that no attempt ought to be made on Malden, without the
heavy artillery...
It may be said that between the first and second council, the enemy's
forces had diminished by desertion. No doubt it had as to numbers.
Great part of the militia had left them, and many of their Indian allies;
but the fort of Malden retained all its strength, and there was no doubt
but that their regular forces (of which not an individual had deserted)
and their remaining militia, was sufficient to man it. ...
My opinion was that an attempt on Malden should never be made until
there was an absolute certainty of success."
SCAPEGOAT: General William Hull
became the scapegoat for all the U.S.
did wrong in preparing and executing
its battle plan in the War of 1812.
Portrait by John Trumbull, 1792. From
the Yale University Art Gallery.
He became infamous for his bloodless
surrender of Fort Detroit — giving up
his superior force to a smaller force
under the command of General Brock
in August of 1812.
became the scapegoat for all the U.S.
did wrong in preparing and executing
its battle plan in the War of 1812.
Portrait by John Trumbull, 1792. From
the Yale University Art Gallery.
He became infamous for his bloodless
surrender of Fort Detroit — giving up
his superior force to a smaller force
under the command of General Brock
in August of 1812.