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The surrender
of Fort Detroit
Letter written by General William Hull at Fort
George on Aug. 26, 1812
Inclosed are the articles of capitulation, by which the Fort of Detroit has
been surrendered to Major-General Brock, commanding his Britannic
Majesty's forces in Upper Canada, and by which the troops have become
prisoners of war. My situation at present forbids me from detailing the
particular causes which have led to this unfortunate event. I will,
however, generally observe, that after the surrender of Michilimackinac,
almost every tribe and nation of Indians, excepting a part of the Miamis
and Delawares, north from beyond Lake Superior, west from beyond the
Mississippi, south from the Ohio and Wabash, and east from every port
of Upper Canada, and from all the intermediate country, joined in open
hostility under the British standard, against the army I commanded,
contrary to the most solemn assurances of a large portion of them to
remain neutral; even the Ottawa Chiefs from Arbecrotch, who formed
the delegation to Washington the last summer, in whose friendship I
know you had great confidence, are among the hostile tribes, and
several of them distinguished leaders. Among the vast numer of chiefs
who led the hostile bands, Tecumseh, Marpot, Logan, Walk-in-the-water,
Split-Log, &c. are considered the principals.
This numerous assemblage of savages, under the entire influence and
direction of the British commander, enabled him totally to obstruct the
only communication which I had with my country. This communication
had been opened from the settlements in the state of Ohio, two
hundred miles through a wilderness, by the fatigues of the army, which I
marched to the frontier on the river Detroit. The body of the Lake being
commanded by the British armed ships, and the shores and rivers by
gun-boats, the army was totally deprived of all communication by water.
On this extensive road it depended for transportation of provisions,
military stores, medicine, clothing, and every other supply, on
pack-horses-all its operations were successful until its arrival at
Detroit,-in a few days it passed into the enemy's country, and all
opposition seemed to fall before it. One month it remained in possession
of this country, and was fed from its resources. In different directions
detachments penetrated sixty miles in the settled part of the province,
and the inhabitants seemed satisfied with the change of situation, which
appeared to be taking place-the militia from Amherstburg were daily
deserting, and the whole country, then under the control of the army,
was asking for protection. The Indians generally, in the first instance,
appeared to be neutralized, and determined to take no part in the
contest.
The fort of Amherstburg was eighteen miles below my encampment. Not
a single cannon or mortar was on wheels suitable to carry before that
place. I consulted my officers, whether it was expedient to make an
attempt on it with the bayonet alone, without cannon to make a breach
in the first instance. The council I called was of the opinion it was
not-The greatest industry was exerted in making preparation, and it was
not until the 7th of August, that two 24-pounders and three howitzers
were prepared. It was then my intention to have proceeded on the
enterprise. While the operations of the army were delayed by these
preparations, the clouds of adversity had been for some time and
seemed still thickly to be gathering around me. The surrender of
Michilimackinac opened the northern hive of Indians, and they were
swarming down in every direction. Reinforcements from Niagara had
arrived at Amherstburg under the command of Colonel Procter. The
desertion of the militia ceased. Besides the reinforcements that came by
water, I received information of a very considerable force under the
command of Major Chambers on the river Le Trench with four
field-pieces, and collecting the militia on his route, evidently destined for
Amherstburg; and in addition to this combination, and increase of force,
contrary to all my expectations, the Wyandots, Chippewas, Ottawas,
Pottawatamies, Munsees, Delawares, &c. with whom I had the most
friendly intercourse, at once passed over to Amherstburg, and accepted
the tomahawk and scalping knife.
There being now a vast number of Indians at the British post, they were
sent to the river Huron, Brownstown, and Maguago to intercept my
communication. To open this communication, I detached Maj. Vanhorne
of the Ohio volunteers with two hundred men to proceed as far as the
river Raisin, under an expectation he would meet Capt. Brush with one
hundred and fifty men, volunteers from the state of Ohio, and a quantity
of provision for the army. An ambuscade was formed at Brownstown,
and Maj. Vanhorn's detachment (was) defeated and returned to camp
without effecting the object of the expedition.
In my letter of the 7th inst. you have the particulars of that transaction,
with a return of the killed and wounded. Under this sudden and
unexpected change of things, and having received an express from
General Hall, commanding opposite the British shore on the Niagara
river, by which it appeared that there was no prospect of any
co-operation from that quarter, and the two senior officers of the
artillery having stated to me an opinion that it would be extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to pass the Turkey river and river
Aux-Cannard, with the 24-pounders, and that they could not be
transported by water, as the QUEEN-CHARLOTTE which carried eighteen
24-pounders, lay in the river Detroit above the mouth of the river
Aux-Cannard; and as it appeared indispensibly necessary to open the
communication to the river Raisin and the Miami, I found myself
compelled to suspend the operation against Amherstburg, and
concentrate the main force of the army at Detroit.
Fully intending, at that time, after the communication was open, to
re-cross the river, and pursue the object at Amherstburg, and strongly
desirous of continuing protection to a very large number of the
inhabitants of Upper Canada, who had voluntarily accepted it under my
proclamation, I established a fortress on the banks of the river, a little
below Detroit, calculated for a garrison of three hundred men. On the
evening of the 7th, and morning of the 8th inst. the army, excepting the
garrison of 250 infantry, and a corps of artillerists, all under the
command of Major Denny of the Ohio volunteers, re-crossed the river,
and encamped at Detroit.
In pursuance of the object of opening the communication, on which I
considered the existence of the army depending, a detachment of six
hundred men, under the command of lieut. Colonel Miller was
immediately ordered. For a particular account of the proceedings of this
detachment, and the memorable battle which was fought at Maguago,
which reflects the highest honor on the American arms, I refer you to my
letter of the 13th of August, a duplicate of which is enclosed, in this.
Nothing however but honor was acquired by this victory; and it is a
painful consideration, that the blood of seventy-five gallant men could
only open the communication as far as the points of their bayonets
extended. The necessary care of the sick and wounded, and a very
severe storm of rain, rendered their return to camp indispensably
necessary for their own comfort. Captain Brush, with his small
detachment, and the provisions, being still at the river Raisin, and in a
situation to be destroyed by the savages, on the 13th inst. in the
evening, I permitted Colonels M'Arthur and Cass to select from their
regiment four hundred of their most effective men, and proceed (by) an
upper route through the woods, which I had sent an express to direct
Capt. Brush to take, and had directed the militia of the River Raisin to
accompany him as a reinforcement. The force of the enemy continually
increasing, and the necessity of opening the communication, and acting
on the defensive, becoming more apparent, I had, previous to detaching
Colonels M'Arthur and Cass, on the 11th inst. evacuated and destroyed
the fort on the opposite bank.
On the 13th, in the evening, Gen. Brock arrived at Amherstburg about
the hour Colonels M'Arthur and Cass marched, of which at that time I
had received no information. On the 15th, I received a summons from
him to surrender fort Detroit, of which I herewith enclose you a copy,
together with my answer. At this time I had received no information from
Cols. M'Arthur and Cass. An express was immediately sent, strongly
escorted, with orders for them to return.
On the 15th, as soon as General Brock received my letter, his batteries
opened on the town and fort, and continued until evening. In the
evening all the British Ships of war came nearly as far up the river as
Sandwich, three miles below Detroit. At daylight on the 16th, (at which
time I had received no information from Cols. M'Arthur and Cass, my
expresses sent the evening before, and in the night, having been
prevented from passing by numerous bodies of Indians) the cannonade
recommenced, and in a short time, I received information, that the British
army and Indians, were landing below the Spring wells under cover of
their Ships of war. At this time the whole effective force at my disposal at
Detroit did not exceed eight hundred men. Being new troops and
unaccustomed to a camp life; having performed a laborious march;
having been in a number of battles and skirmishes, in which many had
fallen, and more had received wounds, in addition to which a large
number being sick, and unprovided with medicine, and the comforts
necessary for their situation; are the general causes by which the
strength of the army was thus reduced. The fort at this time was filled
with women, children, and the old and decrepit people of the town and
country; they were unsafe in the town, as it was entirely open and
exposed to the enemy's batteries. Back of the fort, above or below it,
there was no safety for them on account of the Indians. In the first
instance, the enemy's fire was principally directed against our batteries;
and towards the close it was directed against the fort alone, and almost
every shot and shell had their effect.
It now became necessary either to fight the enemy in the field; collect
the whole force in the fort; or propose terms of capitulation. I could not
have carried into the field more than six hundred men, and left any
adequate force in the fort. There were landed at that time of the enemy
a regular force of much more than that number, and twice that number
of Indians. Considering this great inequality of force, I did not think it
expedient to adopt the first measure. The second must have been
attended with a great sacrifice of blood, and no possible advantage,
because the contest could not have been sustained more than a day for
the want of powder, and but a very few days for the want of provisions.
In addition to this, Cols. M'Arthur and Cass would have been in a most
hazardous situation. I feared nothing but the last alternative. I have
dared to adopt it-I well know the high responsibility of the measure, and
I take the whole of it on myself. It was dictated by a sense of duty, and
a full conviction of its expediency. The bands of savages which had then
joined the British force, were numerous beyond any former example.
Their numbers have since increased, and the history of the barbarians of
the north of Europe does not furnish examples of more greedy violence
than these savages have exhibited. A large portion of the brave and
gallant officers and men I commanded would cheerfully have contested
until the last cartridge had been expended, and the bayonets worn to
the sockets.
I could not consent to the useless sacrifice of such brave men, when I
knew it was impossible for me to sustain my situation. It was impossible
in the nature of things that an army could have been furnished with the
necessary supplies of provision, military stores, clothing, and comforts
for the sick, on pack horses through a wilderness of two hundred miles,
filled with hostile savages. It was impossible, sir, that this little army,
worn down by fatigue, by sickness, by wounds and deaths, could have
supported itself not only against the collected force of all the northern
nations of Indians, but against the united strength of Upper Canada,
whose population consists of more than twenty times the number
contained in the territory of Michigan, aided by the principal part of the
regular forces of the province, and the wealth and influence of the
North-West, and other trading establishments among the Indians, which
have in their employment, and under their entire control, more than two
thousand white men.
Before I close this dispatch it is a duty I owe my respectable associates
in command, Cols. M'Arthur, Findley, Cass, and Lieut. Col. Miller, to
express my obligations to them for the prompt and judicious manner in
which they have performed their respective duties. If aught has taken
place during the campaign which is honorable to the army, these officers
are entitled to a large share of it. If the last act should be disapproved,
no part of the censure belongs to them. I have likewise to express my
obligation to General Taylor, who has performed the duty of
quarter-master-General, for his great exertions in procuring every thing
in his department which it was possible to furnish for the convenience of
the army; like-wise to brigade-major Jessup for the correct and punctual
manner in which he has discharged his duty; and to the army generally
for their exertions, and the zeal they have manifested for the public
interest.
The death of Dr. Foster, soon after he arrived at Detroit, was a severe
misfortune to the army; it was increased by the capture of the Chachaga
packet, by which the medicine and hospital stores were lost. He was
commencing the best arrangements in the department of which he was
the principal, with the very small means which he possessed. I was
likewise deprived of the necessary services of Capt. Partridge, by
sickness, the only officer of the corps of engineers attached to the army.
All the officers and men have gone to their respective homes, excepting
the 4th United States' regiment, and a small part of the first, and Capt.
Dyson's company of artillery. Capt. Dyson's company was left at
Amherstburg, and the others are with me prisoners-they amount to
about 340. I have only to solicit an investigation of my conduct, as early
as my situation, and the state of things will admit; and to add the
further request, that the government will not be unmindful of my
associates in captivity, and of the families of those brave men who have
fallen in the contest.
of Fort Detroit
Letter written by General William Hull at Fort
George on Aug. 26, 1812
Inclosed are the articles of capitulation, by which the Fort of Detroit has
been surrendered to Major-General Brock, commanding his Britannic
Majesty's forces in Upper Canada, and by which the troops have become
prisoners of war. My situation at present forbids me from detailing the
particular causes which have led to this unfortunate event. I will,
however, generally observe, that after the surrender of Michilimackinac,
almost every tribe and nation of Indians, excepting a part of the Miamis
and Delawares, north from beyond Lake Superior, west from beyond the
Mississippi, south from the Ohio and Wabash, and east from every port
of Upper Canada, and from all the intermediate country, joined in open
hostility under the British standard, against the army I commanded,
contrary to the most solemn assurances of a large portion of them to
remain neutral; even the Ottawa Chiefs from Arbecrotch, who formed
the delegation to Washington the last summer, in whose friendship I
know you had great confidence, are among the hostile tribes, and
several of them distinguished leaders. Among the vast numer of chiefs
who led the hostile bands, Tecumseh, Marpot, Logan, Walk-in-the-water,
Split-Log, &c. are considered the principals.
This numerous assemblage of savages, under the entire influence and
direction of the British commander, enabled him totally to obstruct the
only communication which I had with my country. This communication
had been opened from the settlements in the state of Ohio, two
hundred miles through a wilderness, by the fatigues of the army, which I
marched to the frontier on the river Detroit. The body of the Lake being
commanded by the British armed ships, and the shores and rivers by
gun-boats, the army was totally deprived of all communication by water.
On this extensive road it depended for transportation of provisions,
military stores, medicine, clothing, and every other supply, on
pack-horses-all its operations were successful until its arrival at
Detroit,-in a few days it passed into the enemy's country, and all
opposition seemed to fall before it. One month it remained in possession
of this country, and was fed from its resources. In different directions
detachments penetrated sixty miles in the settled part of the province,
and the inhabitants seemed satisfied with the change of situation, which
appeared to be taking place-the militia from Amherstburg were daily
deserting, and the whole country, then under the control of the army,
was asking for protection. The Indians generally, in the first instance,
appeared to be neutralized, and determined to take no part in the
contest.
The fort of Amherstburg was eighteen miles below my encampment. Not
a single cannon or mortar was on wheels suitable to carry before that
place. I consulted my officers, whether it was expedient to make an
attempt on it with the bayonet alone, without cannon to make a breach
in the first instance. The council I called was of the opinion it was
not-The greatest industry was exerted in making preparation, and it was
not until the 7th of August, that two 24-pounders and three howitzers
were prepared. It was then my intention to have proceeded on the
enterprise. While the operations of the army were delayed by these
preparations, the clouds of adversity had been for some time and
seemed still thickly to be gathering around me. The surrender of
Michilimackinac opened the northern hive of Indians, and they were
swarming down in every direction. Reinforcements from Niagara had
arrived at Amherstburg under the command of Colonel Procter. The
desertion of the militia ceased. Besides the reinforcements that came by
water, I received information of a very considerable force under the
command of Major Chambers on the river Le Trench with four
field-pieces, and collecting the militia on his route, evidently destined for
Amherstburg; and in addition to this combination, and increase of force,
contrary to all my expectations, the Wyandots, Chippewas, Ottawas,
Pottawatamies, Munsees, Delawares, &c. with whom I had the most
friendly intercourse, at once passed over to Amherstburg, and accepted
the tomahawk and scalping knife.
There being now a vast number of Indians at the British post, they were
sent to the river Huron, Brownstown, and Maguago to intercept my
communication. To open this communication, I detached Maj. Vanhorne
of the Ohio volunteers with two hundred men to proceed as far as the
river Raisin, under an expectation he would meet Capt. Brush with one
hundred and fifty men, volunteers from the state of Ohio, and a quantity
of provision for the army. An ambuscade was formed at Brownstown,
and Maj. Vanhorn's detachment (was) defeated and returned to camp
without effecting the object of the expedition.
In my letter of the 7th inst. you have the particulars of that transaction,
with a return of the killed and wounded. Under this sudden and
unexpected change of things, and having received an express from
General Hall, commanding opposite the British shore on the Niagara
river, by which it appeared that there was no prospect of any
co-operation from that quarter, and the two senior officers of the
artillery having stated to me an opinion that it would be extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to pass the Turkey river and river
Aux-Cannard, with the 24-pounders, and that they could not be
transported by water, as the QUEEN-CHARLOTTE which carried eighteen
24-pounders, lay in the river Detroit above the mouth of the river
Aux-Cannard; and as it appeared indispensibly necessary to open the
communication to the river Raisin and the Miami, I found myself
compelled to suspend the operation against Amherstburg, and
concentrate the main force of the army at Detroit.
Fully intending, at that time, after the communication was open, to
re-cross the river, and pursue the object at Amherstburg, and strongly
desirous of continuing protection to a very large number of the
inhabitants of Upper Canada, who had voluntarily accepted it under my
proclamation, I established a fortress on the banks of the river, a little
below Detroit, calculated for a garrison of three hundred men. On the
evening of the 7th, and morning of the 8th inst. the army, excepting the
garrison of 250 infantry, and a corps of artillerists, all under the
command of Major Denny of the Ohio volunteers, re-crossed the river,
and encamped at Detroit.
In pursuance of the object of opening the communication, on which I
considered the existence of the army depending, a detachment of six
hundred men, under the command of lieut. Colonel Miller was
immediately ordered. For a particular account of the proceedings of this
detachment, and the memorable battle which was fought at Maguago,
which reflects the highest honor on the American arms, I refer you to my
letter of the 13th of August, a duplicate of which is enclosed, in this.
Nothing however but honor was acquired by this victory; and it is a
painful consideration, that the blood of seventy-five gallant men could
only open the communication as far as the points of their bayonets
extended. The necessary care of the sick and wounded, and a very
severe storm of rain, rendered their return to camp indispensably
necessary for their own comfort. Captain Brush, with his small
detachment, and the provisions, being still at the river Raisin, and in a
situation to be destroyed by the savages, on the 13th inst. in the
evening, I permitted Colonels M'Arthur and Cass to select from their
regiment four hundred of their most effective men, and proceed (by) an
upper route through the woods, which I had sent an express to direct
Capt. Brush to take, and had directed the militia of the River Raisin to
accompany him as a reinforcement. The force of the enemy continually
increasing, and the necessity of opening the communication, and acting
on the defensive, becoming more apparent, I had, previous to detaching
Colonels M'Arthur and Cass, on the 11th inst. evacuated and destroyed
the fort on the opposite bank.
On the 13th, in the evening, Gen. Brock arrived at Amherstburg about
the hour Colonels M'Arthur and Cass marched, of which at that time I
had received no information. On the 15th, I received a summons from
him to surrender fort Detroit, of which I herewith enclose you a copy,
together with my answer. At this time I had received no information from
Cols. M'Arthur and Cass. An express was immediately sent, strongly
escorted, with orders for them to return.
On the 15th, as soon as General Brock received my letter, his batteries
opened on the town and fort, and continued until evening. In the
evening all the British Ships of war came nearly as far up the river as
Sandwich, three miles below Detroit. At daylight on the 16th, (at which
time I had received no information from Cols. M'Arthur and Cass, my
expresses sent the evening before, and in the night, having been
prevented from passing by numerous bodies of Indians) the cannonade
recommenced, and in a short time, I received information, that the British
army and Indians, were landing below the Spring wells under cover of
their Ships of war. At this time the whole effective force at my disposal at
Detroit did not exceed eight hundred men. Being new troops and
unaccustomed to a camp life; having performed a laborious march;
having been in a number of battles and skirmishes, in which many had
fallen, and more had received wounds, in addition to which a large
number being sick, and unprovided with medicine, and the comforts
necessary for their situation; are the general causes by which the
strength of the army was thus reduced. The fort at this time was filled
with women, children, and the old and decrepit people of the town and
country; they were unsafe in the town, as it was entirely open and
exposed to the enemy's batteries. Back of the fort, above or below it,
there was no safety for them on account of the Indians. In the first
instance, the enemy's fire was principally directed against our batteries;
and towards the close it was directed against the fort alone, and almost
every shot and shell had their effect.
It now became necessary either to fight the enemy in the field; collect
the whole force in the fort; or propose terms of capitulation. I could not
have carried into the field more than six hundred men, and left any
adequate force in the fort. There were landed at that time of the enemy
a regular force of much more than that number, and twice that number
of Indians. Considering this great inequality of force, I did not think it
expedient to adopt the first measure. The second must have been
attended with a great sacrifice of blood, and no possible advantage,
because the contest could not have been sustained more than a day for
the want of powder, and but a very few days for the want of provisions.
In addition to this, Cols. M'Arthur and Cass would have been in a most
hazardous situation. I feared nothing but the last alternative. I have
dared to adopt it-I well know the high responsibility of the measure, and
I take the whole of it on myself. It was dictated by a sense of duty, and
a full conviction of its expediency. The bands of savages which had then
joined the British force, were numerous beyond any former example.
Their numbers have since increased, and the history of the barbarians of
the north of Europe does not furnish examples of more greedy violence
than these savages have exhibited. A large portion of the brave and
gallant officers and men I commanded would cheerfully have contested
until the last cartridge had been expended, and the bayonets worn to
the sockets.
I could not consent to the useless sacrifice of such brave men, when I
knew it was impossible for me to sustain my situation. It was impossible
in the nature of things that an army could have been furnished with the
necessary supplies of provision, military stores, clothing, and comforts
for the sick, on pack horses through a wilderness of two hundred miles,
filled with hostile savages. It was impossible, sir, that this little army,
worn down by fatigue, by sickness, by wounds and deaths, could have
supported itself not only against the collected force of all the northern
nations of Indians, but against the united strength of Upper Canada,
whose population consists of more than twenty times the number
contained in the territory of Michigan, aided by the principal part of the
regular forces of the province, and the wealth and influence of the
North-West, and other trading establishments among the Indians, which
have in their employment, and under their entire control, more than two
thousand white men.
Before I close this dispatch it is a duty I owe my respectable associates
in command, Cols. M'Arthur, Findley, Cass, and Lieut. Col. Miller, to
express my obligations to them for the prompt and judicious manner in
which they have performed their respective duties. If aught has taken
place during the campaign which is honorable to the army, these officers
are entitled to a large share of it. If the last act should be disapproved,
no part of the censure belongs to them. I have likewise to express my
obligation to General Taylor, who has performed the duty of
quarter-master-General, for his great exertions in procuring every thing
in his department which it was possible to furnish for the convenience of
the army; like-wise to brigade-major Jessup for the correct and punctual
manner in which he has discharged his duty; and to the army generally
for their exertions, and the zeal they have manifested for the public
interest.
The death of Dr. Foster, soon after he arrived at Detroit, was a severe
misfortune to the army; it was increased by the capture of the Chachaga
packet, by which the medicine and hospital stores were lost. He was
commencing the best arrangements in the department of which he was
the principal, with the very small means which he possessed. I was
likewise deprived of the necessary services of Capt. Partridge, by
sickness, the only officer of the corps of engineers attached to the army.
All the officers and men have gone to their respective homes, excepting
the 4th United States' regiment, and a small part of the first, and Capt.
Dyson's company of artillery. Capt. Dyson's company was left at
Amherstburg, and the others are with me prisoners-they amount to
about 340. I have only to solicit an investigation of my conduct, as early
as my situation, and the state of things will admit; and to add the
further request, that the government will not be unmindful of my
associates in captivity, and of the families of those brave men who have
fallen in the contest.