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Hull on the
defense
of Detroit
Letter from U.S. General William
Hull to the Secretary of War, dated March 6, 1812
The prompt manner in which you have adopted measures for the
protection of Detroit and the other settlements in the territory of
Michigan, inspires me with confidence that such ulterior arrangements
will speedily be made as the peculiar situation of that section of the
United States may require.
How far the measures already adopted will give security to that part of
the country in the event of war with Great Britain, is a subject worthy of
consideration.
Officers of a company have been appointed with orders to recruit in the
territory.
The secretary acting as governor has been authorized to make a
detachment of four companies of militia and call them into actual service.
The commanding officer of fort Detroit has been directed to erect
batteries on the banks of the river Detroit fro the protection of the town.
These, as incipient measures I very much approve, and was particularly
pleased with the decisive manner they were adopted. It must be
apparent however they add no physical strength to that section of the
country. The force already there is only better organized and prepared
to be called into action. By comparing this force with the force which may
be opposed to us, will evince the necessity of additional means of
defence, if the territory is worth preserving.
In the fort of Detroit I understand by the last returns there are less than
one hundred regulars-the population of the territory is less than five
thousand-and this population of the territory principally of Canadian
Character-Connected with the post of Detroit, and three hundred miles
North, is the island of Michilimackinac, where is a fort garrisoned by a
company of regulars. Near the South bend of Lake Michigan on the
Westerly side is fort Dearborn, likewise garrisoned by a company of
regulars.
This is all the force on which we can at present calculate for the safety of
our frontier and for the protection of the Indians which the United States
are bound by treaties to afford.
No support can be derived from the Indian Nations, even in the event of
war, because our officers are instructed to advise them to remain
neutral-and not to accept their services if they should be offered.
I will now consider the British force opposed to this part of the United
States.
A fort at Amherstberg at the mouth of the Detroit river, garrisoned by
about one hundred British troops-another fort on the island of St.
Joseph's at the mouth of the river St. Mary's, garrisoned by about fifty
British troops-two armed ships on Lake Erie, which command the waters
and would prevent all communication from the States through that
channel-a population of at least fifty thousand in that part of Upper
Canada which is connected with the Detroit river and Lake Erie, and
could easily be brought to operate against our settlements-about four
thousand men, principally Canadian employed in the Indian trade and
under British influence-and lastly may be reckoned all the Indians in
Upper Canada, and a large proportion of the powerful nations residing in
the territory of the United States, who now hold a constant and friendly
intercourse with the British agents, and are liberally fed and clothed by
the bounty of the British government.
It appears from this statement that the British force which can be
brought to operate against us in the territory, is more than ten to one,
without including the Indians.
It requires no difficult reasoning to determine what must be the
consequence-that part of the United States must fall into the hands of
the British government, with all the inhabitants-the forts at Chicago,
Michilimackinac and Detroit, and all the public stores, with the public and
private vessels on the Lake, the forts at Chicago, Michilimackinac and
Detroit, and all the country North and North-west of the Miami of Lake
Erie-and the settlements on the western part of the state of Ohio, will
be subject to the depredations of the powerful northern nations of
savages. There is nothing in my opinion (in the event of war) can
prevent this state of things but an adequate force on the Detroit river,
opposite to the settlements in Upper Canada. It may be asked how is
this force to be placed there, and how is it to be supported? If sir, we
cannot command the Ocean, we can command the inland Lakes of our
country-I have always been of the opinion that we ought to have built
as many armed vessels on the Lakes as would have commanded
them-we have more interest in them than the British nation, and can
build vessels with more convenience. If, however, there is no intention
of the kind, that communication must be abandoned until we take
possession of the Canadas.
The army which marches into the country must open roads through the
wilderness, and the supplies and provisions of whatever else may be
necessary, must pass by hand through the state of Ohio. If the conquest
of the Canadas is the object of the government, they will then have an
army in a proper situation to commence operations, and at the same
time protect the defenceless inhabitants and control the Indians within
our territory. The answer probably may be, it is more expedient to leave
the Michigan territory to it's fate, and direct the force to Montreal. This
will prevent all communication by the St. Lawrence with Upper Canada,
and it must of course surrender. In this expectation I think it probable
there would be a disappointment-if a force is not sent sufficient to
oppose the British force which may be collected at Amherstberg and it's
vicinity, Detroit, Michilimackinac and Chicaga must fall-the inhabitants
must once more change their allegiance, and the Indians become the
exclusive friends and allies of the King their great Father. In the garrison
at these places they will find large quantities of arms and military stores
of every king.-Upper Canada and our country of which they will be in the
possession, will furnish them with provisions-How then will Upper
Canada be conquered by possessing Montreal?
They will be in the quiet possession of their country and a part of
our's-and how are they to be approached? You cannot approach them
by water, because they command the Lakes-In approaching them by
land you must pass through a wilderness filled with savages under
British control, and devoted to British interest. The consequences of such
an attempt may probably be best learned from the history of the
campaign in that very country conducted by Gens. Harmar, St. Clair and
Wayne. In Upper Canada they have a governor who is a Major Gen. in
their army-who commands the regular troops, the militia and the
Indians-the whole force of the country is therefore combined under his
command and may be directed to a single point without any collision.
From the preceding state(ment) of facts and observations it must be
apparent that fort Detroit and the settlements in it's neighbourhood-and
likewise Michilimackinac and Chicaga under present circumstances are in
the power of the British-and that their possession of them would be
extremely calamitous to the United States.
In the event of peace with England I am of opinion that the northern
frontier ought to be better protected than it is at present in the event of
war-and the object being the reduction of the provinces of Upper and
Lower Canada, I think it must be evident that the establishment of an
army at Detroit, sufficient to defend that part of the country, control the
Indians, and commence operations on the weakest points of defence of
the enemy, would be an incipient measure indispensably necessary.
With respect to the other points of attack I shall make no observations,
as I probably shall have no agency in them. In considering this subject I
have endeavoured to divest myself of all local feelings, and grounded my
observations and opinions on public considerations alone.
Two things appear to me to be certain, one is that in the event of war,
the enemy will attempt to take possession of that country, with a view
to obtain the assistance of the Indians residing in our territory; and the
other is, that under its present circumstances of defence, it will be in
their power to do it. A part of your army now recruting may be as well
supported and disciplined at Detroit as at any other place. A force
adequate to the defence of that vulnerable point, would prevent a war
with the savages, and probably induce the enemy to abandon the
province of Upper Canada without opposition. The naval force on the
Lakes would in that event fall into our possession-and we should obtain
the command of the waters without the expence of building such a force.
The British cannot hold Upper Canada without the assistance of the
Indians, and that assistance they cannot obtain if we have an adequate
force in the situation I have pointed out.
There is another consideration very important. It will do more to prevent
a general Indian war, as far West, and beyond the Mississippi, than any
other measure. The Indians cannot conduct a war without the
assistance of a civilized nation.
The British establishment at Amherstberg is the great emporium from
which even the most distant Indians receive their supplies. A force at the
point I have mentioned would prevent all communication of the Indians
with that post-indeed sir, in every point of view in which the subject can
be considered, it appears to me of the first importance to adopt the
measure.
defense
of Detroit
Letter from U.S. General William
Hull to the Secretary of War, dated March 6, 1812
The prompt manner in which you have adopted measures for the
protection of Detroit and the other settlements in the territory of
Michigan, inspires me with confidence that such ulterior arrangements
will speedily be made as the peculiar situation of that section of the
United States may require.
How far the measures already adopted will give security to that part of
the country in the event of war with Great Britain, is a subject worthy of
consideration.
Officers of a company have been appointed with orders to recruit in the
territory.
The secretary acting as governor has been authorized to make a
detachment of four companies of militia and call them into actual service.
The commanding officer of fort Detroit has been directed to erect
batteries on the banks of the river Detroit fro the protection of the town.
These, as incipient measures I very much approve, and was particularly
pleased with the decisive manner they were adopted. It must be
apparent however they add no physical strength to that section of the
country. The force already there is only better organized and prepared
to be called into action. By comparing this force with the force which may
be opposed to us, will evince the necessity of additional means of
defence, if the territory is worth preserving.
In the fort of Detroit I understand by the last returns there are less than
one hundred regulars-the population of the territory is less than five
thousand-and this population of the territory principally of Canadian
Character-Connected with the post of Detroit, and three hundred miles
North, is the island of Michilimackinac, where is a fort garrisoned by a
company of regulars. Near the South bend of Lake Michigan on the
Westerly side is fort Dearborn, likewise garrisoned by a company of
regulars.
This is all the force on which we can at present calculate for the safety of
our frontier and for the protection of the Indians which the United States
are bound by treaties to afford.
No support can be derived from the Indian Nations, even in the event of
war, because our officers are instructed to advise them to remain
neutral-and not to accept their services if they should be offered.
I will now consider the British force opposed to this part of the United
States.
A fort at Amherstberg at the mouth of the Detroit river, garrisoned by
about one hundred British troops-another fort on the island of St.
Joseph's at the mouth of the river St. Mary's, garrisoned by about fifty
British troops-two armed ships on Lake Erie, which command the waters
and would prevent all communication from the States through that
channel-a population of at least fifty thousand in that part of Upper
Canada which is connected with the Detroit river and Lake Erie, and
could easily be brought to operate against our settlements-about four
thousand men, principally Canadian employed in the Indian trade and
under British influence-and lastly may be reckoned all the Indians in
Upper Canada, and a large proportion of the powerful nations residing in
the territory of the United States, who now hold a constant and friendly
intercourse with the British agents, and are liberally fed and clothed by
the bounty of the British government.
It appears from this statement that the British force which can be
brought to operate against us in the territory, is more than ten to one,
without including the Indians.
It requires no difficult reasoning to determine what must be the
consequence-that part of the United States must fall into the hands of
the British government, with all the inhabitants-the forts at Chicago,
Michilimackinac and Detroit, and all the public stores, with the public and
private vessels on the Lake, the forts at Chicago, Michilimackinac and
Detroit, and all the country North and North-west of the Miami of Lake
Erie-and the settlements on the western part of the state of Ohio, will
be subject to the depredations of the powerful northern nations of
savages. There is nothing in my opinion (in the event of war) can
prevent this state of things but an adequate force on the Detroit river,
opposite to the settlements in Upper Canada. It may be asked how is
this force to be placed there, and how is it to be supported? If sir, we
cannot command the Ocean, we can command the inland Lakes of our
country-I have always been of the opinion that we ought to have built
as many armed vessels on the Lakes as would have commanded
them-we have more interest in them than the British nation, and can
build vessels with more convenience. If, however, there is no intention
of the kind, that communication must be abandoned until we take
possession of the Canadas.
The army which marches into the country must open roads through the
wilderness, and the supplies and provisions of whatever else may be
necessary, must pass by hand through the state of Ohio. If the conquest
of the Canadas is the object of the government, they will then have an
army in a proper situation to commence operations, and at the same
time protect the defenceless inhabitants and control the Indians within
our territory. The answer probably may be, it is more expedient to leave
the Michigan territory to it's fate, and direct the force to Montreal. This
will prevent all communication by the St. Lawrence with Upper Canada,
and it must of course surrender. In this expectation I think it probable
there would be a disappointment-if a force is not sent sufficient to
oppose the British force which may be collected at Amherstberg and it's
vicinity, Detroit, Michilimackinac and Chicaga must fall-the inhabitants
must once more change their allegiance, and the Indians become the
exclusive friends and allies of the King their great Father. In the garrison
at these places they will find large quantities of arms and military stores
of every king.-Upper Canada and our country of which they will be in the
possession, will furnish them with provisions-How then will Upper
Canada be conquered by possessing Montreal?
They will be in the quiet possession of their country and a part of
our's-and how are they to be approached? You cannot approach them
by water, because they command the Lakes-In approaching them by
land you must pass through a wilderness filled with savages under
British control, and devoted to British interest. The consequences of such
an attempt may probably be best learned from the history of the
campaign in that very country conducted by Gens. Harmar, St. Clair and
Wayne. In Upper Canada they have a governor who is a Major Gen. in
their army-who commands the regular troops, the militia and the
Indians-the whole force of the country is therefore combined under his
command and may be directed to a single point without any collision.
From the preceding state(ment) of facts and observations it must be
apparent that fort Detroit and the settlements in it's neighbourhood-and
likewise Michilimackinac and Chicaga under present circumstances are in
the power of the British-and that their possession of them would be
extremely calamitous to the United States.
In the event of peace with England I am of opinion that the northern
frontier ought to be better protected than it is at present in the event of
war-and the object being the reduction of the provinces of Upper and
Lower Canada, I think it must be evident that the establishment of an
army at Detroit, sufficient to defend that part of the country, control the
Indians, and commence operations on the weakest points of defence of
the enemy, would be an incipient measure indispensably necessary.
With respect to the other points of attack I shall make no observations,
as I probably shall have no agency in them. In considering this subject I
have endeavoured to divest myself of all local feelings, and grounded my
observations and opinions on public considerations alone.
Two things appear to me to be certain, one is that in the event of war,
the enemy will attempt to take possession of that country, with a view
to obtain the assistance of the Indians residing in our territory; and the
other is, that under its present circumstances of defence, it will be in
their power to do it. A part of your army now recruting may be as well
supported and disciplined at Detroit as at any other place. A force
adequate to the defence of that vulnerable point, would prevent a war
with the savages, and probably induce the enemy to abandon the
province of Upper Canada without opposition. The naval force on the
Lakes would in that event fall into our possession-and we should obtain
the command of the waters without the expence of building such a force.
The British cannot hold Upper Canada without the assistance of the
Indians, and that assistance they cannot obtain if we have an adequate
force in the situation I have pointed out.
There is another consideration very important. It will do more to prevent
a general Indian war, as far West, and beyond the Mississippi, than any
other measure. The Indians cannot conduct a war without the
assistance of a civilized nation.
The British establishment at Amherstberg is the great emporium from
which even the most distant Indians receive their supplies. A force at the
point I have mentioned would prevent all communication of the Indians
with that post-indeed sir, in every point of view in which the subject can
be considered, it appears to me of the first importance to adopt the
measure.
